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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Based upon the evidence presented by the State, the jury could conclude that
Jesse Elias entered uninvited into the home of a female acquaintance, went up into her
bedroom and, while she was asleep, penetrated her vagina with his finger. Mr. Elias
was charged with, and convicted of, penetration by a foreign object and burglary.
However, Mr. Elias' actions are not prohibited by the statute under which he was
prosecuted because the penetration occurred while the victim slept, and the legislature
has not designated this as a means by which unlawful penetration by a foreign object
can be accomplished under Idaho Code § 18-6608. Therefore, Mr. Elias asserts that
the State has failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction for
penetration by a foreign object, and this Court must vacate that conviction.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging that Jesse Elias had committed the
crimes of penetration by a foreign object and burglary. (R., pp.13-14.) Mr. Elias waived
his right to a preliminary hearing, was bound over into the district court, and an
Information was filed charging him with the above crimes. (R., pp.25-29.) Prior to trial,
the State filed an Amended Information adding an alternative means by which Mr. Elias
allegedly committed burglary.1

(R., pp.42-43.) Mr. Elias pled not guilty and his case

proceeded to a jury trial. (R., pp.30-32, 59-64.)

1 The original Information alleged that Mr. Elias entered the alleged victim's apartment
with the intent to commit the crime of penetration by a foreign object, while the
Amended Information alleged Mr. Elias had the intent to commit either the crime of
penetration by a foreign object or the crime of rape. (R., pp.29, 43.)

1

Shantell Steciuk testified that she was an acquaintance of Jesse Elias, meeting
him through his sister who often visited her boyfriend living next door to Ms. Steciuk.
(Tr. Trial, p.31, L.1 - p.38, L.1.)

Although he had been a guest inside her triplex

apartment in the past, Mr. Elias did not have permission to enter Ms. Steciuk's
residence without asking her first. (Tr. Trial, p.38, L.18 - p.39, L.9.) After locking her
doors, Ms. Steciuk went to bed at about 10:30 on the night of July 19, 2010, with her
two small children lying next to her. (Tr. Trial, p.31, Ls.16-21, p.39, L.10 - 40, L.22.)
When asked what she remembered next, Ms. Steciuk testified, "I woke up with Jesse
sitting on the end of my bed, and he had his fingers inside my vagina." (Tr. Trial, pAO,
Ls.20-24.) She then rolled onto her right side and felt Mr. Elias touch her a second time
on "like my butt right before, you know, before my vagina" but "[i]t didn't go in."
(Tr. Trial, pA1, L.23 - pA2, L.23.) Ms. Steciuk testified that she then wrapped herself in
a blanket and Mr. Elias was denied in his attempt to touch her a third time. (Tr. Trial,
pA3, L.13 - pA4, L.22.)2
The jury found Mr. Elias guilty of both penetration by a foreign object and
burglary.3 (R., p.91.) The district court sentenced Mr. Elias to a total unified term of fifty
years, with ten years fixed, for the penetration by a foreign objection conviction, and a
concurrent term of ten years fixed for the burglary conviction, with the court retaining
jurisdiction.

(R., pp.1 01-1 04; Tr., 1/31/11, p.14, Ls.6-20.)

Mr. Elias successfully

2 The jury heard additional testimony from Officer Kevin Schmeckpeper, the
investigating officer, Dr. Henry Amon Jr., a doctor who examined Ms. Stecuik finding "a
relatively minor abrasion on the right side, on the inside of [Ms. Stecuik's] labium and
her inner lips," Shirley Bechtel, Mr. Elias' sister, and Mr. Elias himself who testified that
he did enter Ms. Steciuk's apartment, although he denied any criminal intent when
doing so, and who also denied penetrating Ms. Steciuk's vagina. (Tr. Trial, p.68, L.15 ~.86, L.17, p.95, L.20-p.106, L.14, p.111, L.15-p.132, L.18, p.134, L.7-p.182, L.19.)
Mr. Elias does not challenge his burglary conviction in this appeal.
2

completed his rider and the district court placed him on probation for a period of
fourteen years. (R., pp.113-117; Tr., 7/20/11, p.27, Ls.8-12.) Mr. Elias filed a Notice of
Appeal timely from the district court's Retained Jurisdiction Disposition and Notice of
RighttoAppeal. 4 (R., pp.113-117, 121-124.)

Although Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a) has since been amended, at the time the district
court filed the Sentencing Disposition and Notice of Right to Appeal in January of 2011,
the time to file a Notice of Appeal enabling a challenge to all aspects of the conviction
and sentence was enlarged by the time the district court retained jurisdiction. See
I.A.R. 14(a) (2010). Therefore, Mr. Elias' challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is
ripe for review in this appeal.
4

3

ISSUE
Should this Court vacate Mr. Elias' conviction for unlawful penetration by a foreign
object because there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction?
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ARGUMENT
This Court Should Vacate Mr. Elias' Conviction For Unlawful Penetration By A Foreign
Object Because There Was Insufficient Evidence To Support The Conviction

A.

Introduction
The Idaho legislature has described three means by which the crime of

penetration by a foreign objectS can be committed under Idaho Code § 18-6608: 1) by
the use of force or the threat of force; 2) where the victim is incapable of giving lawful
consent due to unsoundness of mind; and 3) where the victim is prevented from
resisting due to an intoxicating, narcotic or anesthetic substance.

I.C. § 18-6608.

Unlike other crimes that occur at the point of penetration such as rape and male rape,
the legislature has omitted from I.C. § 18-6608 any language describing the commission
of unlawful penetration by a foreign object occurring due to the victim being asleep.

Compare I.C. § 18-6608 with I.C. § 18-6101(6)(a) and with I.C. § 18-6108(7). Because
the evidence presented and believed by the jury demonstrated that the act of digital
penetration occurred while Ms. Steciuk was asleep, and was not accomplished by the
use of force or threat of force, Ms. Stecuik did not suffer from unsoundness of mind (as
that term has been defined in Idaho), and there was no evidence that Ms. Steciuk was
under the influence of any intoxicating or narcotic substance, the State presented
insufficient evidence to support Mr. Elias' conviction for penetration by a foreign object,
requiring this Court to vacate that conviction.

The crime's official title is "Forcible sexual penetration by use of a foreign object."
I.C. § 18-6608.

5
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B.

A Conviction Founded Upon Insufficient Evidence Violates A Defendant's Right
To Due Process Of Law And Must Be Vacated
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the State

of Idaho from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law." U.S. Const. Amd. XIV. "Just as 'Conviction upon a charge not made would be
sheer denial of due process,' so is it a violation of due process to convict and punish a
man without evidence of his guilt." Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 206
(1960) (quoting De Jonge v. State of Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362 (1937) (additional
citations omitted).) "It is axiomatic that a conviction upon a charge not made or upon a
charge not tried constitutes a denial of due process." Jackson v. Virginia, 433 U.S. 307,
314 (1979) (citations omitted).
The sufficiency of the evidence presented to sustain a conviction can be raised
for the first time on appeal. State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873,877-878 (1995). "Appellate
review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. A finding of guilt will not be
overturned on appeal where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier
of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the
essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Warburton, 145
Idaho 760, 761-62 (Ct. App. 2008).

C.

Mr. Elias Was Convicted Of Penetration By A Foreign By Means Not Prohibited
By Idaho Code § 18-6608
1.

Idaho Code § 18-6608 Does Not Criminalize Penetration By A Foreign
Object Where The Person Whose Genital Or Anal Opening Is Penetrated
Is Merely Asleep When The Penetration Occurs

Mr. Elias was charged with penetration by a foreign object in violation of Idaho
Code § 18-6608. (R., pp.28-29, 42-43.) Idaho Code § 18-6608 reads as follows:

6

Every person who, for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification or
abuse, causes the penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal
opening of another person, by any object, instrument or device, against
the victim's will by use of force or violence or by duress, or by threats of
immediate and great bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of
execution, or where the victim is incapable, through any unsoundness of
mind, whether temporary or permanent, of giving legal consent, or where
the victim is prevented from resistance by any intoxicating, narcotic or
anesthetic substance, shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison for not more than life.
I.C. § 18-6608. 6 By its plain language, this code section describes a mens rea (for the
purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse), and an actus reas (penetration,
however slight, of the genital or anal opening of another person, by any object,
instrument or device).

I.C. § 18-6608. In addition, this code section describes three

means by which the penetration becomes unlawful due to the mental status of the
victim:
1) Against the victim's will by use of force or violence or by duress, or by threats
of immediate and great bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of
execution;
2) Where the victim is incapable, through any unsoundness of mind, whether
temporary or permanent, of giving legal consent; or
3) Where the victim is prevented from resistance by any intoxicating, narcotic or
anesthetic substance.
I.C. § 18-6608. Notably absent from this code section is any mention of the penetration
becoming unlawful because the person whose genital or anal opening is penetrated is
asleep. Id.
In contrast, in both the rape statute and the male rape statute, the legislature has
explicitly described the crime as occurring where the victim is asleep.
Code § 18-1601 states in pertinent part,

6

The title of this statue is, "Forcible sexual penetration by use of foreign object."

7

Idaho

Rape is defined as the penetration, however slight, of the oral, anal or
vaginal opening with the perpetrator's penis accomplished with a female
under anyone (1) of the following circumstances:
(6) Where she is at the time unconscious of the nature of the act. As used
in this section, "unconscious of the nature of the act" means incapable of
resisting because the victim meets one (1) of the following conditions:
(a) Was unconscious or asleep;
(b) Was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant that the act
occurred.
I.C. § 18-6101(6). Likewise, Idaho Code § 18-6108 states in pertinent part,
Male rape is defined as the penetration, however slight, of the oral or anal
opening of another male, with the perpetrator's penis, for the purpose of
sexual arousal, gratification or abuse, under any of the following
circumstances:
(7) Where the victim is at the time unconscious of the nature of the act,
and this is known to the accused.
I.C. § 18-6108(7). In both of these statutes, perpetration of the crime due to the victim
being unconscious is listed as a separate means of committing the crime. This means
is listed in addition to force or threat of force, unsoundness of mind, and intoxication,
which are all listed as separate means of committing both rape and male rape in their
respective statutes. See I.C. §§ 18-6101(3)-(5) and I.C. §§ 18-6108(3)-(6). Under the
doctrine of in pari material, the absence of language in the penetration by a foreign
object statute (I.C. § 18-6608) criminalizing penetration while the victim is sleeping,

"The rule that statutes in pari materia are to be construed together means that each
legislative act is to be interpreted with other acts relating to the same matter or subject.
Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same subject. Such statutes are
taken together and construed as one system, and the object is to carry into effect the
intention. It is to be inferred that a code of statutes relating to one subject was governed
by one spirit and policy, and was intended to be consistent and harmonious in its
several parts and provisions. For the purpose of learning the intention, all statutes
relating to the same subject are to be compared, and so far as still in force brought into
harmony by interpretation." State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 382 (1999) (quoting Grand
Canyon Dories v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 124 Idaho 1,4 (1993).)
7
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where such language is specifically included in both the rape (I.C. § 18-6101) and the
male rape (I.C. § 18-6108) statutes, demonstrates that the legislature has omitted
penetration occurring while the victim is sleeping from the conduct prohibited by the
penetration by a foreign object statute (I.C. § 18-6608).
Furthermore, the language in Idaho Code § 18-6608 describing "Where the
victim is incapable, through any unsoundness of mind, whether temporary or
permanent, of giving legal consent," cannot be read to include the victim being asleep.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has found, "the term 'unsoundness of mind' as used in
I.C. § 18-6101 (2)8 refers to mental disability caused by mental illness, retardation or
other abnormality." State v. Doe, 137 Idaho 691, 693 (Ct. App. 2002). While the Court
of Appeals in that case specifically rejected the State's argument that "unsoundness of
mind" could refer to mental limitations resulting from normal childhood developments,
the Court's reasoning equally rejects any claim that unsoundness of mind could refer to
sleeping. Id. The Doe Court found:

Our conclusion is based principally upon the usual, everyday meaning of
the term. "Unsound" is defined by Webster's Third New International
Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 2511 (1993), to mean "not
physically healthy or whole ... having a disease, abnormality, or defect of
such a nature or to such a degree as to impair usefulness," and "not
mentally sound or normal: not wholly or consistently sane." As these
definitions demonstrate, unsoundness of mind in ordinary usage
refers to a condition brought about by a mental disease or defect, not
the mental immaturity of a normal child. This interpretation of
"unsoundness" as used in § 18-6101 (2) is consistent with the Idaho
Supreme Court's comment in State v. Soura, 118 Idaho 232, 237, 796
P.2d 109, 114 (1990), that the purpose of subsection (2) is "to protect
women with mental disabilities."
Id. (emphasis added). The Court continued:

8 This clause has since been renumbered as I.C. § 18-6101 (3).
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Our conclusion is bolstered by the legislative history of the statute. Prior to
1994, subsection (2) prohibited sexual intercourse with a female who was
incapable of giving consent "through lunacy or any other unsoundness of
mind .... " In 1994, the italicized words were deleted from the statute. 1994
Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 135, § 1, p. 307. This amendment was apparently
enacted to remove archaic language that had become offensive in
contemporary usage, and it evidences no legislative intent to change the
meaning of the statute. It is of interest, however, that in its original
form the subsection equated unsoundness of mind with "lunacy,"
which confirms that "unsoundness of mind" was legislatively
intended to refer to mental illness or mental abnormality.
Id. at 693-694 (emphasis added).
When read in pari materia, the legislature's use of the phrase, "Where the victim
is incapable, through any unsoundness of mind, whether temporary or permanent, of
giving legal consent," found in I.C. § 18-6608, has the same meaning as the phrase,
"Where she is incapable, through any unsoundness of mind, due to any cause
including, but not limited to, mental illness, mental disability or developmental disability,
whether temporary or permanent, of giving legal consent," found in I.C. § 18-6101(3).
Both phrases refer to the victim's lack of consent being due to a mental illness, not to
being asleep.
While the legislature has the power to amend I.C. § 18-6608 to include a
prohibition against penetration of the victim due to a lack of consent caused by the
victim being asleep, this Court does not have the power to enact such legislation
through judicial decree.

See Verska v. Sf. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151

Idaho 889, 892-893 (2011) (noting that the power to correct a socially or otherwise
unsound statute lies with the legislature, and not the judiciary). Thus, Idaho Code § 186608, the statute the State of Idaho both enacted and charged Mr. Elias with violating,
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does not criminalize penetration by a foreign object solely due to the victim being asleep
when the penetration occurs.9

2.

The State Presented No Evidence To Support A Finding That Mr. Elias
Penetrated Ms. Stecuik's Vagina In A Manner Prohibited By Idaho
Code § 18-6608

The State presented no evidence that Mr. Elias penetrated Ms. Stecuik's vagina
in a manner prohibited by I.C. § 18-6608. No evidence was presented that Mr. Elias
used force or the threat of force, that Ms. Stecuik was of unsound mind, or that
Ms. Stecuik was under the influence of any narcotic or intoxicating substance.
Ms. Stecuik described the event as follows:
A.
I woke up with Jesse sitting on the end of my bed, and he had his
fingers inside of my vagina.

Q.

About what time was this?

A.

Um, about 3:30.

Q.

In the morning?

A.

Yes.

Q.

This would be on July 20 th then?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What was - what was it that woke you up at 3:30 a.m.?

A.

Somebody touching me.

Q

What do you mean?

A.
Like not normally, you know, like I would roll over and my kids
would touch me, you know, that kind of stuff didn't wake me up, but he having his fingers inside of me.

9 That is not to say that the victim being asleep is a defense to a charge brought under
I. C. § 18-6608.
If, for example, the victim's sleep was caused by intoxicating
substances or the victim was unsound of mind, a defendant who penetrated the victim's
genital or oral opening with a foreign object can still be charged under I.C. § 18-6608.
11

Q

And when you woke up was there any pain associated with that?

A.
Yes. When I first felt it, I rolled over onto my right side, and I felt it
kind of like a razor cut kind of burn feeling from, and that's what really
woke me up.
Q.

This razor cut burning feeling, where did you feel it from?

A.

Inside my vagina.

Q.
And after you - did you roll onto your side or - well, first of all, how
were you positioned?
A.

I was laying on my back, and I had rolled over onto my right side.

Q.

And how were you dressed?

A.

I had a big T-shirt on.

Q.

Is that what you would customarily wear then is a nightgown?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

Is that it? Is that all you had on?

A.

Yes.

When you woke up and his hands were where you described - his
hand was where you described where it was, um, where did you roll to?
Q.

A.

Onto my right side.

Q.
And when you did that what happened to the hand that was inside
your vagina?
A.
It moved when I rolled over, and then I felt it again after I rolled
over.
Q.

Describe the second time that you felt it.

A.

It didn't go in, but I felt him touching me still.

Q.

Where did you feel him touching you the second time?

A.
Um, on my - on my - like my butt right before, you know, my
vagina.

12

Q.

What side did you feel it touching? Was it the right side or your left

side?

A.

It was on the back side.

And when this happened how was Mr. Elias positioned on the bed,
do you recall?
Q.

A.
Yeah. He was sitting on the end of my bed to the left of me, kind of
sitting sideways with his right arm by me.
Q.

And were your kids in the same location on either side of you?

A.
Yes. I had my - I believe my daughter was on my left side, and my
son was on my right side.
Q.

Were they still asleep?

A.

Yes, they were.

Q.

What did you do after you felt him touch you a second time?

A.
Rolled over again onto my left side to cover myself completely with
my blanket.
Q.

What do you mean cover yourself with your blanket?

A.
Like wrap myself up like a hot dog kind of in my blanket so that way
he couldn't get in there again.
What happened after you rolled the - after the second time you felt
him touch you?

Q.

A.

He asked me if I knew who he was.

Q.

Describe how he went about asking you that.

A.

He just said, "Do you know who I am? Do you know who I am?"

Q.

How many times did he say that, "Do you know who I am?"

A.

About three.

Q.

And when he was saying this were you able to see his face at all?

A.
Um, it was pretty dark in my room. My T.V. was on, but I could see
like the outline of him, and I think about the third time that he asked me
was when I realized who he was just because of his voice.
13

About how far away was he from you when he was doing this
touching of you?
Q.

A.

He was sitting right at my feet, like right to the left of my feet.

Q.

Did he attempt to touch you a third time?

A.

Yes he did.

Q.

Can you tell us about that, please?

A.

He didn't make it under the blanket. I was wrapped.

Q.

Where did you feel his hand this time?

A.
I felt it under the blanket like under my leg, but he couldn't get
through the blanket.
Q.

What happened after the third time that he attempted to touch you?

A.
That was when he asked me for the third time if I knew who he
was, and I said, "Yes, Jesse, I do," and he said, "Do you want me to
leave," and I said, "Yes, I do," and he got up and he walked into my
bathroom which was right next to my bedroom - well, that's where I think
he went. I didn't get up and follow him, but it sounded like he went into the
bathroom, and that's when I called my friend who I had been staying with
prior because I didn't want to - I didn't know what to do. I didn't want to
panic and call the cops, I didn't know what was gonna happen, so I called
my friend, and then he stayed on the phone with me while I called
dispatch.
(Tr. Trial, p.40, L.23 - p.45, L.11.) Ms. Stecuik testified to no other acts of penetration.
(Tr. Trial, p.45, L.12 - p.68, L.6.)
Ms. Stecuik's description of the events do not describe a violation of
I.C. § 18-6608. As such, the State presented insufficient evidence to support Mr. Elias'
conviction for violating that statute.
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D.

This Court Must Vacate Mr. Elias' Conviction
Because there was no evidence to support a finding that Mr. Elias committed

acts prohibited by I.C. § 18-6608, this Court must vacate Mr. Elias' conviction for
violating I.C. § 18-6608. See Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960).

CONCLUSION
Mr. Elias respectfully requests that this Court vacate his penetration by a foreign
object conviction and the resulting sentence imposed.
DATED this 21 st day of May, 2012.

JASONI~~PINTLER
Deputy tPJte Appellate Public Defender
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